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Abstract 
It is often argued that an important reason why globalization may lead to GDP growth but fail to 
reduce poverty is because the poor are unable to participate in the new market opportunities and 
are marginalized. In this paper we examine the experience of resource-poor farmers in south 
India, who participated aggressively in the new market opportunities that opened up with trade 
reforms. However, these expanded market opportunities failed to improve their welfare. The 
paper examines why and how this happened. 
As cotton prices increased sharply following the reforms, a number of poor farmers shifted to 
cotton cultivation. However, cotton cultivation requires much greater technical expertise, 
working capital, and marketing network than the traditional crops. Interestingly, as state support 
declined, the network of private traders rapidly expanded to meet not only the marketing needs 
of the new crops but also to provide working capital and technical expertise. We show how this 
expanded, and largely unregulated, operation of private traders in multiple markets also 
provided them with the opportunity to extract greater surplus from the farmers. Thus, while 
increased participation in external markets exposed farmers to greater price risks and fraudulent 
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dealings by the private traders, the shrinking role of the state reduced the farmers’ ability to 
cope with these risks. The result was a decline in average incomes of the resource-poor farmers 
and rising levels of indebtedness, as costs of production grew sharply.  
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we examine how globalization, although providing the potential for higher 
overall economic growth, may often fail to improve the wellbeing of the poor. Several 
recent econometric studies have examined the impact of globalization on poverty using 
data from a wide range of countries.1 However, these studies have largely used reduced-
form specifications that do not shed any light on the different pathways through which 
globalization affects the wellbeing of the poor. Thus it is not surprising that most of the 
current debate is focused on technical issues regarding whether and to what extent 
globalization has increased world poverty rather than on understanding how 
globalization affects the poor. The latter requires an analysis of the multiple pathways 
that different regions/countries have undertaken. The process of globalization integrates 
different regions, but there is a large diversity in the manner and the extent to which this 
integration takes place. Understanding this diversity is critical in the formulation of 
antipoverty policies around the world. 
Thus, for instance, it is often argued that globalization leads to an increase in poverty 
through the process of marginalization of the poor (Murshed 2002). ‘Marginalization of 
the poor’ in this context implies that (i) the participation of the poor in growing markets 
is limited and is falling (in relative terms), and/or (ii) the opportunities for their growth 
are shrinking as the country opens up.2 Marginalization may occur because the poor 
lack access to the resources (such as human capital, land, credit or other physical assets) 
that are needed in order to participate in the growing markets. The recent experience of 
many low-income countries—particularly in Africa and some in Latin America—is 
cited as strong evidence of globalization leading to marginalization of the poor and 
consequently to higher poverty.  
Against this presumption of marginalization of the poor in the process of globalization, 
there are also numerous instances where the poor have significantly increased their 
participation in new export markets. However, the evidence regarding the effect of this 
increased participation on poverty levels is mixed.3 In this paper we are interested in 
understanding the processes by which increased market participation by the poor may 
lead, under certain conditions, to further deterioration of their wellbeing. In order to do 
so, we examine the case of resource-poor farmers in the Telangana region in the 
northwestern part of the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) in India. We focus on AP because 
it is a very stark representation of some of the paradoxes of globalization. When the 
World Bank started working directly with state governments in India, AP was its focus 
state. It was at the forefront of reforms initiated in the areas of fiscal discipline, 
                                                 
1   See, for instance, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002), Dollar and Kraay (2001), Winters, McCulloch and 
McKay (2004), and Chen and Ravallion (2000). 
2   Shorrocks (2002: xv) points out that marginalization means that the participation of the poor low-
incomes countries ‘in the increased trade that globalization brings is limited, and in many instances is 
declining in real terms. Their access to  private international financial market is practically non-
existent, and their share of real inward investment is in many cases declining’. It should be noted that 
marginalization connotes a generalized tendency towards systematic and progressive fall in relative 
shares over the long run and not just short-term variability. 
3  See, for instance, Harrison (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the evidence.  
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decentralized governance, and encouragement of foreign direct investment.4 The state 
was also a major recipient of funding from multilateral organizations as well as private 
investors. Over the past decade, AP has witnessed higher growth rates than the average 
for the rest of the country. Its particularly impressive performance in the area of 
information technology brought it into international limelight.  
However, the greater market opportunities afforded by globalization did not 
automatically translate into greater welfare for the resource-poor farmers in this state. In 
particular, in the Telangana region, which accounts for roughly 40 per cent of the 
population in the state of Andhra Pradesh, rural poverty rates increased somewhat in the 
post-reform period from 1993-94 to 1999-2000.5 There have been several reports on 
widespread agrarian distress in other parts of the state as well (GoAP 2005). One 
disturbing symptom of this distress is the unprecedented and continued rise in the rate of 
farmer suicides over the past few years (Vidyasagar and Chandra 2004). In this paper 
we argue that the reason why resource-poor farmers in AP have not benefited from 
globalization is not because they became marginalized, as generally believed. In fact, 
we find that these farmers increased their participation in export markets (in both 
absolute and relative terms) and have been highly receptive to international technology 
transfers. This is particularly true of poor farmers in the semi-arid Telangana region of 
the state who did not benefit as much from the earlier green revolution technologies as 
opposed to the better-endowed coastal regions of the state. Trade liberalization provided 
them the opportunity to expand their production of remunerative export crops, like 
cotton, using modern technology in the form of hybrid seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. 
Thus it could be argued that these farmers, far from being left behind, were at the 
frontier of the globalization wave. 
How did greater participation of the resource-poor farmers in the growing markets 
afforded by globalization lead to lower welfare? This is the central puzzle addressed in 
this paper. A few explanations have been offered in the globalization literature to 
explain why this might happen. A common explanation is that the high volatility of 
international commodity markets leads to significant income shocks for poor farmers 
who lack adequate safety nets. This is true for the cotton farmers in our study also, but it 
is only part of the explanation. It explains temporary income shortfall, but not chronic 
poverty. An alternative explanation is that in many developing countries (including 
India) trade liberalization occurred as part of the IMF/World Bank initiated structural 
adjustment programmes that also included cutbacks in several pro-poor public 
investments and social programmes. These cutbacks in public spending may have 
contributed to the rise in poverty. However, it is also true—as proponents of these 
reforms are quick to argue—that such reforms give a powerful boost to private 
enterprise which is arguably more efficient. In the Indian context, particularly, the 
growth of the private sector in the post-reform period has been spectacular. Ironically, 
our analysis reveals that it was the fast but largely unregulated growth of the private 
sector, even into areas traditionally reserved for the public sector (such as agricultural 
credit, research, and extension) that explains a large part of the problem. Markets grew 
                                                 
4  Under the leadership of reform minded Chief Minister Naidu, Andhra Pradesh was widely hailed as 
‘the state that would reform India’ (The Economist 2000: 38). 
5   Poverty estimates reported in this study are based on NSSO expenditure surveys and are explained in 
greater detail in section 5.  
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but their governance lagged far behind, and it was the poor who suffered 
disproportionately, as we show in the paper.  
2  Background 
In this section we start with a brief overview of the macroeconomic scenario in the pre-
reform and post-reform period in India. We then discuss the long-term trends in the 
agricultural sector of Andhra Pradesh. The discussion in this section helps set the later 
analysis on rural poverty and its underlying causes in a broader perspective.  
2.1  Macro economic scenario: pre-reform and post-reform period 
From the time India became an independent nation in 1947, its policy regime has been 
characterized by extensive controls on domestic production, pricing, trade and a 
managed overvalued exchange rate. In the specific case of agriculture, the main thrust of 
policy since the mid-1960s had been on achieving food self-sufficiency. Domestic 
policy instruments used to attain this goal included input subsides on fertilizers, power 
and irrigation, minimum support prices for major crops (such as rice and wheat), and 
quantitative restrictions on agricultural exports and imports. While the industrial sector 
was heavily protected under the import substitution regime, agricultural production was 
in the aggregate actually dis-protected (taxed) by as much as 20 per cent from 1970 to 
the mid-1990s (Gulati and Kelley 1999). This is because although expenditures on price 
supports and input subsidies were large, these were more than offset by the relatively 
low domestic farm-gate prices that were sustained behind the border measures.  
In 1991, faced with a balance of payments crisis, India embarked on an economic 
reform programme in line with the structural adjustment and stabilization policies 
initiated by the IMF and World Bank. The reforms focussed largely on trade 
liberalization, encouraging foreign direct investment, reforming capital markets, and 
deregulating domestic business. At the same time, the rupee was made convertible on 
the trade account, leading to a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate over the next 
several years. The reforms initiated the process of making Indian industry more 
competitive internationally, strengthening the balance of payments, and boosting 
economic growth. Since 1990 average annual growth has averaged 5.6 per cent and 
inflation has been relatively low (Gulati and Kelley 1999). 
It is important to bear in mind that domestic and border policies directly affecting 
agriculture were not included in these early reform efforts. However, the reduced levels 
of industrial protection increased incentives in the agricultural sector through an 
improvement in the domestic terms of trade, as shown in Figure 1. The terms of trade 
between Indian agriculture and industry worked against agriculture through the mid-
1980s but have turned to favour agriculture since the early 1990s (Landes and Gulati 
2003). In 1994, import restrictions on oilseeds, sugar and cotton were liberalized but 
most agricultural products remained subject to import controls. As the reforms 
progressed and the foreign exchange situation became more comfortable, quantitative 
import restrictions on a whole range of agricultural commodities were phased out 
starting in 2001. The impetus for these changes came from the market access disciplines 
of the Uruguay Round on Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). Another significant 
development in recent years has been the commercial introduction of genetically  
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modified cotton seed varieties in 2002 by the multinational corporation, Monsanto. In 
this paper, however, we focus only on the effects of the limited agricultural trade 
liberalization that took place from the mid to late 1990s. This is because poverty 
estimates (based on the latest round of NSSO expenditure survey) are only available for 
this period. 
It is interesting to note that while the government pushed heavily for border policies, input 
subsidies on fertilizer, power, and irrigation remained largely unaffected by the reforms.6 
Minimum support policy for major crops (such as wheat and rice) also remained virtually 
untouched because of the fear of political retaliation.
 The inability of the government to 
control the large outlays on subsidies for agricultural inputs and outputs, together with 
fiscal tightening, curtailed its ability to invest in rural infrastructure. Even in the pre-
reform period from 1980-81 to 1990-91, gross capital formation by the pubic sector in 
agriculture had fallen by 32 per cent (at constant 1993-94 prices). Following the reforms 
in 1991, the downward trend continued and by the year 2000-01 this statistic had fallen by 
a further 11 per cent from its 1990-91 level (Figure 1). To some extent, this fall in the 
public sector’s investment was compensated by the private sector, whose share in total 
gross capital formation in agriculture increased from 49 per cent in 1980-81 to 78 per cent 
in 2000-01. However, the share of agriculture in total gross capital formation in the 
economy fell from 15 per cent to 5 per cent during this period. In the case of AP, 
particularly, this falling trend in the share of agriculture has been even more pronounced. 
The share of agriculture and allied activity in state government expenditures under various 
plans declined from 11.8 per cent in 1980-81 to 1.8 per cent in 2001-02 (Rao and Suri 
2006).  
Figure 1 
 Terms of trade and gross agricultural capital formation in India  
 
Source:   GOI (2004). 
                                                 
6   Landes and Gulati (2003) point out that ‘the budgetary outlays on the major input subsidies for inputs, 
have not been subject to discipline under the URAA. The subsidy outlays are below the de minimis 
levels permitted in the URAA and, at any rate, each of the major subsidies has been notified as a 
subsidy for low income and resource poor farmers and, hence, not subjected to discipline’.   
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With the movement towards financial liberalization, greater pressure was put on 
nationalized banks to improve their performance.7 Formal credit to agriculture was 
squeezed, as banks became even more averse to lending to agricultural borrowers, 
particularly smaller borrowers. The proportion of bank credit to small borrowers (below 
Rs 25,000) dropped from 18 per cent of total commercial scheduled bank credit in 1994 
to 5 per cent by 2002 (Mahajan 2004). Priority sector lending to agricultural sector also 
suffered a significant blow, coming down from 16 per cent in 1990 to 11.6 per cent in 
1999 (Singh and Sagar 2004). Relaxing of some of the earlier restrictions on the 
location of commercial banks further intensified the shift away from rural areas, as the 
cost of delivery of credit in rural India is much higher than in urban India. The share of 
rural sector in total credit fell from an already low level of 19 per cent in 1992-93 to 14 
per cent in 1998-99. It is alarming to note that the share of rural areas, and in particular 
the agricultural sector, fell not only in relative terms but also absolute terms. The 
number of bank accounts in rural areas fell by 8.41 million and the number of borrowers 
from the agricultural sector decreased by 4.51 million during this period (Singh and 
Sagar 2004). In the next subsection we discuss the impact of this credit squeeze and 
other policy changes on agricultural development during the post reform period in AP. 
2.2  Long-term trends in agricultural sector in Andhra Pradesh 
To set the discussion on the impact of reforms in perspective, it is useful to begin with a 
brief overview of the long-term trends in the agricultural sector in Andhra Pradesh. 
Located in the southeastern part of the country, AP is the fifth largest state in India. It is 
one of the major surplus producers of rice and accounted for about 13 per cent of the 
country’s total production in 1998-99. The agricultural sector contributed 28 per cent of 
the state’s gross domestic product and employed about 70 per cent of the workforce in 
1998-99. There has been a gradual deceleration in the growth rate of agricultural output 
in AP from 3.4 per cent per annum in the 1980s to 2.3 per cent per annum in the 1990s 
(GoAP 2005). The growth rate of yield of rice, the state’s principal irrigated crop 
declined steeply from an annual rate of 3.1 per cent in the 1980s to 1.3 per cent in the 
1990s. During the same period, the average annual growth rate of yield of cotton also 
declined from 3.4 per cent to 1.4 per cent.  
An important structural change in the agricultural economy of AP has been the growing 
proportion of small and marginal holdings.8 Around 66 per cent of operational holdings 
in AP were small or marginal in 1970-71. This proportion grew sharply over the years, 
and by 1995-96 it stood at around 80 per cent (Table 1). The proportion of small and 
marginal holdings in the total cultivated area also grew sharply from 19 per cent in 
1970-71 to 43 per cent in 1995-96. The large proportion of marginal and small holdings 
in the agricultural economy of AP has important implications for the economic viability 
and sustainability of agriculture in the state, as we discuss later. In addition, after 
Punjab, AP also has the highest incidence of landlessness among rural households in 
                                                 
7   For instance, the Narasimhan Committee report in 1993 recommended that banks should focus on 
profitability and adopt prudential norms. This implied more stringent provisioning for non-performing 
loans than earlier (Mahajan 2004). 
8   These size categories are defined as follows: (i) marginal if land owned is less than 1 hectare, (ii) 
small if land owned is greater than 1 but less than 2 hectares, (iii) medium if land owned is greater 
than 2 but less than 5 hectares; and (iv) large if land owned is greater than 5 hectares.  
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India. Around 46 per cent of rural households in AP were landless in 1970-71, in contrast 
to 35 per cent at the all-India level. By 1999-2000, the proportion of landless grew to 52 
per cent in AP compared to 41 per cent at the all-India level.9 
Irrigation has been very critical to the agricultural development of Andhra Pradesh in 
terms of increasing yields, facilitating multiple cropping, and providing insurance against 
the highly uncertain rainfall in the semi-arid regions of the state. Gross irrigated area in 
1998-99 accounted for about 45 per cent of the total cultivated area in AP. While 
irrigation through publicly funded sources (such as canals and tanks) has been historically 
very important in AP, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed rapid growth in the number of 
privately owned wells. As shown in Figure 2, net irrigated area under wells increased by 
140 per cent between 1981-82 and 1998-99. In contrast to this, the area under canals 
 
Table 1 












 Percentage  of  holdings 
1970-71 46.0  19.6  17.4 12.7  4.3 
1995-96 59.4  21.3  13.2 5.3 0.8 
 Percentage  of  area 
1970-71 8.0  11.3  19.2 35.2 26.3 
1995-96 20.2  22.5  26.0 22.5  8.9 
Source:   GoAP (2003). 
Figure 2 
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Source:  World Bank (2001). 
                                                 
9  These statistics are based on NSSO surveys.  
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and tanks declined in both absolute and relative terms in the 1990s due to a deceleration in 
public investment and public neglect of traditional water sources. Farmers from all land 
ownership categories have invested heavily in private wells. However, since digging wells 
is a large, lumpy, and highly risky investment, the probability of well-ownership varies 
inversely with land ownership (Aggarwal 2000). A World Bank funded survey of 
irrigation technologies in AP in 1999-200 finds that even though small and marginal 
farmers accounted for around 80 per cent of total holdings in the state, they owned only 
48 per cent of the total electric powered wells in the state (World Bank 2001).  
The increase in groundwater irrigation during this period has been particularly sharp in 
the Telangana region where it is now the major source of irrigation as opposed to coastal 
AP where canal irrigation is predominant. The Telangana region lies in the northwestern 
part of the state10 and is generally considered the least developed part of the state. It has a 
semi-arid climate and some of its subregions are highly drought prone. The average 
rainfall is about 800 mm and varies considerably across the years. In the rest of this paper, 
we focus largely on the Telangana region.  
3  Trade liberalization and market participation of resource-poor farmers 
We begin by discussing the basic characteristics of resource-poor farmers in the context 
of agriculture in the Telangana region. Then we examine why and how these farmers 
increased their participation in export markets in the post-reform period. 
3.1  Characterizing resource-poor farmers 
In most rural poverty profiles, agricultural land ownership is used as an important (and 
often the sole) criterion to distinguish between poor and non-poor households. However, 
as argued before, irrigation is a critical input in agricultural production that effectively 
enhances the productive value of land, particularly in semi-arid regions. Thus, instead of 
distinguishing between farmers on the basis of their land ownership alone, we also take 
into account their access to different sources of irrigation, to reflect the fact that a farmer 
who owns a piece of land in a canal-irrigated area is much better endowed than a farmer 
with an otherwise similar holding in a region but with no access to public sources of 
irrigation. Moreover, since around 80 per cent of holdings in this region are classified as 
small or marginal, classification by landownership alone is not very useful without 
information on whether these lie in rainfed or irrigated areas. Several studies report that 
poverty decreases as the availability of irrigation increases. For instance, a recent study by 
Singh, Kumar and Woodhead (2002) finds that poverty rates in 1993 among marginal 
farmers with no irrigation were 32 per cent as opposed to a poverty rate of 22 per cent 
among their counterparts with more than 80 per cent of land irrigated. In semi-arid 
regions, this differential between irrigated and non-irrigated areas is likely to be larger. So 
for the purposes of this study, we define resource-poor farmers as those small and 
marginal farmers who have no access to any assured source of irrigation. 
                                                 
10  Telangana consists of the districts of Adilabad, Karimnagar, Nizamabad, Medak, Ranga Reddy, 
Hyderabad, Mahbubnagar, Nalgonda, Warangal and Khammam districts.  
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Table 2 
Cropping patterns during different seasons in AP across irrigation categories 
   Non-owners 
Crop  Electric well-owners  Canal users  Water purchasers  Rainfed 
  Kharif (rainy) season 
Rice 49.48  60.30  54.15  17.10 
Other cereals  4.99 3.19  0.99  13.89 
Pulses 3.08  3.73  2.78  10.51 
Cotton 8.17  14.19  6.71  17.04 
Coconut 2.70  0.34  0.25   
Oil seed  5.14  2.76 3.83  21.90 
Spices 6.24  6.46  4.50  6.57 
Sugarcane 11.08  5.03 14.14  0.95 
Tobacco 2.44  0.40  4.94  2.67 
Fruits 4.08  0.23  2.34   
Vegetables 1.43  1.60 3.09  1.54 
Total 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
  Rabi (post rainy season) season 
Paddy 41.99  25.61  24.13  11.58 
Pulses 14.66  9.81  13.81  24.65 
Cotton 0.48  19.77  20.19  21.91 
Coconut 2.90  0.42  0.41   
Fruits 4.88  0.29  3.86   
Oil seeds  7.08  18.58 12.61  28.84 
Spices 0.64  7.97  6.91  7.28 
Sugarcane 5.99  6.10    2.14 
Vegetables 21.19  11.45 18.08  3.37 
Total 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 



















Rice Cotton  
Source: CES  (1998).  
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Cropping patterns differ widely across farmers, depending on whether they have access 
to assured sources of irrigation. As shown in Table 2, for those who own wells with 
electric pumps or have access to canal irrigation, rice is the main crop grown in kharif 
(rainy) and rabi (post rainy) seasons. On the other hand, for those farmers who do not 
have an assured supply of irrigation, coarse cereals, pulses groundnut, oilseeds, and 
cotton are important. It is not difficult to see why rice is the preferred choice among 
farmers who have an assured source of irrigation. Rice is an important food crop that 
helps meet the consumption needs of the farmer while also providing him with an 
assured market income since rice is heavily protected through state intervention in the 
open market. Rice has also witnessed substantial yield increases over the past decades. 
Compared to yields in 1960-61, yields obtained in early 1980s were 90 per cent higher 
(GOI 2004). The extension and research network for rice has also been much more 
extensive than for any other crop.  
On the other hand, millets, maize, cotton, pulses, chillies, and oilseeds have been the 
only viable alternatives for farmers with no assured sources of irrigation. These crops 
are less water intensive and are grown under both rainfed and irrigated conditions. 
Expected net returns from the cultivation of these crops have been much lower than for 
the irrigated crops, while the risks are higher because of rainfall variability and price 
fluctuations (in the absence of effective price support polices). In particular, as shown in 
Figure 3, price of cotton is associated with much higher volatility than that of rice. In 
addition, cotton cultivation has also been subject to the risk of pest attacks. This factor, 
in particular, deterred many poor farmers from growing cotton in the pre-reform period. 
3.2  Supply response of resource-poor farmers to cotton trade liberalization  
Restrictions on cotton trade were lifted in 1994 and as a consequence, cotton prices in 
the Telangana region rose from Rs 1,339 per quintal in 1993-94 to Rs 2,057 per quintal 
in 1994-95 (CES 1998). This sharp price increase suddenly made cotton a very 
attractive crop, particularly for farmers without access to irrigation. The total supply of 
cotton more than doubled from 101,697 quintals in 1993-94 to 262,208 quintals in 
1997-98, as farmers shifted to cotton cultivation even in regions where it had not been 
traditionally grown. This sharp supply response to rising prices is consistent with 
evidence from previous studies that also report a relatively high own price elasticity of 
supply for cotton (Gulati and Kelly 1999).11 In a recent study based on panel data from 
13 states, Kanwar and Sadoulet (2001) find that the area planted under cotton is highly 
responsive to its gross profitability (relative to two major competing crops) with the 
associated long-run elasticity of 0.1, which was higher than that for all other cash crops. 
Most of the expansion in cotton cultivation was in the rainfed areas, as farmers shifted 
away from millets and maize to cotton. As shown in Table 1, cotton accounted for more 
than 20 per cent of total acreage for rainfed farmers in the 1999-2000 rabi season, while 
it accounted for less than 1 per cent of total acreage for well-owners. In 1998-99, about 
95 per cent of rice and sugarcane area was irrigated, 75 per cent of wheat, 34 per cent of 
maize, 20 per cent of groundnuts and only 17 per cent of cotton. 
                                                 
11  In contrast to this, the supply elasticity of rice has been found to be much less responsive to own 
prices (Gulati and Kelley 1999). As expected, supply elasticity for rice is highly significant with 
respect to availability of irrigation.  
10 
India now has the largest area in the world under cotton cultivation (21 per cent of the 
total) but accounts for only 14 per cent of global production. Compared to global levels, 
the cotton yield in India is one of the lowest, mainly due to lack of irrigation, limited 
supplies of quality seeds, and poor management practices. Marketing of both cottonseed 
and lint is done by three major groups, the private traders, state level cooperatives and 
Cotton Corporation of India (CCI). Of the three groups, private traders handle more than 
70 per cent of cottonseed and lint followed by cooperatives and CCI. The government 
annually establishes minimum support prices (MSPs) for various cotton varieties on the 
basis of recommendations from the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices. The 
government-run CCI is entrusted with market intervention operations when market price 
falls below minimum support price.12 However, as Rao and Suri (2006) argue, CCI’s role 
in cotton markets in AP has been minimal because the MSP for cotton has been set at a 
very low level and has consistently fallen far below the market price. For the past few 
years, the government of AP has recommended higher MSPs for cotton because of the 
state’s much higher costs of production relative to the all-India average (GoAP 2005). The 
union government, however, has not followed these recommendations and, according to 
several studies, the minimum support price is lower than the average cost of production 
(GoAP 2005; NCF 2006).  
4  The path from increased market participation to debt trap 
In the previous section we discussed the shift in the cropping pattern of resource-poor 
farmers from food crops (such as maize and millets) to cotton, as a consequence of trade 
liberalization. In this section we delineate how this shift in cropping pattern led to greater 
indebtedness. We begin by examining how the working capital requirements of the 
farmers grew because of the shift to cotton cultivation and the sharp escalation in input 
costs. Then we examine the sources of credit (formal versus informal) for resource-poor 
farmers and the emergence of private traders as an important source of credit. Finally, we 
take an in-depth look at the nature of contracts between private traders and farmers and 
how these contributed to the rising levels of farmer indebtedness.  
4. 1 Working capital requirement for cotton 
With the cropping pattern shifting away from millets and maize to cotton, agriculture in 
rainfed areas of AP became highly intensive in use of purchased inputs, thus leading to a 
sharp increase in the working capital requirements of farmers. Cotton is the most pesticide 
intensive crop grown in AP. At the all-India level, although cotton is grown on about 5 
per cent of the cultivated area only, it accounts for nearly 50 per cent of pesticide 
consumption (Venugopal 2004). The per hectare variable costs for unirrigated cotton 
cultivation in Warangal district in the Telangana region in 1997-98 were almost 4 times 
that for maize and 2.5 times that for groundnut (Table 3). Compared to irrigated crops 
such as rice also, the variable costs for irrigated cotton on a per hectare basis are much 
higher (Table 2). Among all the states in India, AP now has the highest consumption of 
pesticides per unit of output and second highest consumption of fertilizers (GoAP 2005).  
                                                 
12  An important exception is the state of Maharashtra, where there is state monopoly procurement. 
Cotton cultivators in this state are prohibited from selling seed cotton to any buyer other than 
Maharashtra State. Cooperative Marketing Federation.  
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This sharp escalation in working capital requirements is reflected, in part, in the data from 
the latest all-India survey of indebtedness among farm households carried out by the 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO 2005b). The survey reports that 82 per cent 
of farm households in AP were indebted in 2001, as opposed to 49 per cent at the all-India 
level. The survey also finds that a growing proportion of outstanding loans among farm 
households in AP were used for meeting current agricultural expenditures, as opposed to 
capital expenditures. In 2001, current agricultural expenditures accounted for close to half 
of total outstanding loans in AP while capital expenditures accounted for only about a 
quarter. In contrast to this, at the all-India level, only 35 per cent of outstanding loans 
were used for current expenditures and 37 per cent for capital expenditures. Even in 
agriculturally advanced states, such as Haryana and Punjab, a much lower proportion of 
outstanding loans was used for current expenditures (33 per cent and 43 per cent, 
respectively). Thus the case of AP is somewhat unusual and to explore this further, we 
turn our attention next to the sources of lending for farmers in the province. 
 
Table 3 
Costs and returns for major crops in Warangal District in Telangana 
 Cotton  Groundnut  Maize  Rice 

















































































Human  labour  14844  8719  15788  9053   4076 1778 4248 
Bullock  labour  1482 1112 1482 1482    1482  1482  1791 
Seed  1482 1482 1482 1482    1482  642  926 
Manure  1482 1482 1482 1482    0  988  988 
Fertilizer  4619 4199 5088 4594    371  2100  2099 
Pesticides  5558 4199 7287 5706    494  1544  642 
Irrigation 2470  494  2470  494    741  0  3705 
Interest on working capital  3816  2601  2470  494    618  363  835 
             
Total variable costs  35753  24288  39315  26893    10917  6407  14741 
Total fixed costs  15610  7524  15610  7524    4730  3285  5785 
Total costs  51364  3181  54925  34397    15647  9692  20526 
             
Yield  22.2 14.8 14.6 10.1   5  22  39.026 
Price  1685 1685 1960 1960    2717  988  440 
             
Gross  returns  34726 23208 27071 19007    5977  8892  18673 
Returns over paid costs   11802  5103  -1707  -4619    1030  4500  9811 
Returns over variable 
costs 
-1028 -1079 -1225 -7867    -4940  2485  3932 
Returns over total costs  -16638  -8603 -27879 -15391    -9670  -800  -1880 
Source: CES  (1998). 
4.2  Formal versus non-formal sources of lending for resource-poor farmers  
Several studies note that in spite of the expansion of banking in the rural sector, a large 
section of the rural poor remains outside the fold of formal credit institutions. A recent  
12 
survey of rural households’ access to financial services, conducted in 2003, reports that 
only 24 per cent of rural households in AP accessed credit from formal sources (Basu. 
and Srivastava 2005).13 Of all the rural households, landless labourers, tenants, and 
those with small holdings face the worst situation. Thus, for instance, the RFAS-2003 
survey observes that 87 per cent of marginal farmers had no access to formal credit 
sources and thus relied more heavily on non-formal sources credit than other cultivating 
households. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that in many parts of AP 
(particularly so in the Telangana region), the land registers are poorly maintained. As 
the Report of the Commission on Farmers’ Welfare points out,  
in many areas (especially Telangana region) the names of the current 
holders and actual cultivators are not recorded in the land registers, such 
cultivators are not eligible for institutional finance and a range of other 
public benefits such as compensation in the event of natural calamities, 
and so on. In addition, some regions (especially in more irrigated areas) 
have a high proportion of tenancy, which is typically unrecorded, and 
tenant farmers face similar difficulties in accessing bank loans and other 
benefits. They are therefore all driven to the informal credit market, 
which supplies loans at very high rates of interest, which in turn adds 
greatly to their cost of cultivation. In tribal areas there are even more 
difficult issues of land entitlement... (GoAP 2005: 26) 
The interest rates on loans from non-formal sources, such as village moneylenders and 
traders, are significantly higher than that from formal sources. As shown in Table 4, the 
median interest rate on loans from the formal sector is around 12 per cent per annum. In 
sharp contrast to this, the dispersion of interest rates on non-formal sector loans is much 
larger, with the median interest rate on loans observed to be around 36 per cent per 
annum. Agricultural moneylenders have historically been important among the non-
formal sources of credit. However, in recent years, private traders have emerged as 
important suppliers of credit, as we discuss next.  
Table 4 
Source-wise interest charges on agricultural loans in selected villages of Andhra Pradesh 
 Institutional  loans  Non-Institutional loans  Total loans 
Rate of interest, %  No.  Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage 
<12  4  1.75   0  0   4  0.04 
12  112 49.2    14 1.51    126  10.94 
13-23  73  32.02   3  0.32   71  6.16 
24  31 13.59    370 40.04    401 34.81 
36  8  3.5   479  51.84   487  42.27 
48  0  0   5  0.54   5  0.04 
60  0 0    37 4    37  3.21 
>60  0  0   16  1.73   16  1.39 
Total 228 
(19.79) 
100   924 
(80.21) 
100   1152 
(100) 
100 
Source:   GoAP (2005). 
                                                 
13  Rural Financial Access Survey (RFAS-2003) conducted by the World Bank and National Council of 
Applied Economic Research, New Delhi.  
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4.3  Extraction of surplus through interlinked contracts with private traders 
To meet farmers’ growing credit needs, private traders in seeds, pesticides, and output 
also began to supply credit. Such contracts between a trader-lender and farmer-borrower 
are quite pervasive in India and also other parts of the world. In these contracts, the 
trader lends to the farmer in exchange for a promise to deliver the crop at a pre-agreed 
price discount or at harvest time when market prices are the lowest. Several formal and 
informal accounts suggest that the countryside in the Telangana region is flooded with 
pesticide dealers and their agents, with one recent report suggesting that there are as 
many as 13,000 dealers in the district of Warangal alone (Menon 2004). This would 
suggest that the pesticide market is quite competitive. However, as Venugopal (2004) 
agues, the market is differentiated by product (several different pesticide formulations 
are now available) and location (local village shop versus the market in the nearest 
town). Further, for the resource-poor farmers buying pesticides on credit, the market is 
limited to local traders who know them well. The personalized nature of such 
interlinking can act as a barrier to the entry of other parties, thus creating a fragmented 
market structure, with each trader commanding considerable monopolistic power. It is 
well known that by operating in multiple markets (inputs and/or output and credit), a 
trader can extract greater surplus than is possible through single markets (Basu 1997; 
Gangopadhyay and Sengupta 1987).14 
In the literature on trader-lender interlinked contracts, an optimal interlinked contract is 
generally characterized by an interest rate discount, which is compensated by 
underpayment in the output market.15 In our case, the interest rate discount is difficult 
to verify empirically because we have no direct information on what the interest rate 
would be in the absence of the interlinked contract. However, the interest rate discount, 
if present, is likely to encourage the farmer to borrow more than he would otherwise. 
Furthermore given that the loan is fully collateralized against the value of the standing 
crop, the trader also has the incentive to overextend the loan. If this is so, then it is 
possible that this kind of interlinkage also leads to increased indebtedness for the 
farmer. Most models on interlinked contracts are based on one-period settings, and thus 
this possibility of growing indebtedness over time has not been formally analysed.  
The latest all-India survey on farmers’ indebtedness (NSSO 2005b) lends some indirect 
support to the above argument on rising indebtedness and overextension of loans. The 
survey finds the incidence of indebtedness among Andhra Pradesh farmers to be the 
highest among all other states in India while the asset value of farm households in AP 
(Rs 0.135 million) was found to be less than the all-India average (Rs 0.373 million). As 
discussed earlier, around 82 per cent of the farm households in the state were found to 
be indebted. Interestingly, the survey reports that the proportion of indebted households 
is more or less the same among all socioeconomic groups. This suggests that the 
problem of indebtedness is pervasive in the agrarian economy. More importantly, the 
survey records a debt liability-to-asset value ratio of 7.14 in AP, which is the highest 
                                                 
14  In the context of a Nash bargaining framework, Bell (1988) shows that the farmer may be worse-off 
with an interlinked set of transactions than with a separate set of bilateral bargains. 
15  See for instance, Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987).  
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among all the states of India (NSSO 2005c: 38).16 This ratio is considered to be an 
important measure of the risk exposure of farmers, with high values (generally above 
0.70) as being indicative of future repayment problems. The very high level of debt 
liability-to-asset value ratio observed in AP is somewhat of a puzzle. In part, this may 
be explained by the high rates of default on loans from institutional sources and the 
overextension of loans under the special personalized nature of interlinked credit-
product contracts, as discussed above.  
Another significant change in AP in the post-reform period was the decline in public 
investment in agricultural extension services and associated attempts to privatize 
extension services. Public expenditure on extension, which is borne by the state 
government, was only 0.02 per cent of the state’s GDP during 1992-94 as against the all-
India average of 0.15 per cent (GoAP 2005). The Report of Commission of Farmers’ 
Welfare (GoAP 2005: 18) observes that ‘with the virtual breakdown of the extension 
machinery and lack of access to institutional credit, small and marginal farmers became 
increasingly dependent upon the private traders for credit and extension services’. This is 
further corroborated by evidence from a recent NSSO survey on ‘access to modern 
technology for farming’ according to which only 9.4 per cent of the Andhra Pradesh 
farmers had access to information from extension workers in 2002 (NSSO 2005c). Private 
traders played a much larger role in AP, with around 30 per cent of farmers accessing 
information through them compared with just 13 per cent at the all-India level.  
This additional role of the trader as the provider of scientific information further 
enhances the potential for strategic manipulation of contract terms and extraction of 
gain. As mentioned earlier, cotton is vulnerable to a very high risk of pest attack. This 
problem intensified as more and more farmers moved from other crops to cotton, thus 
creating cotton monocultures that are more susceptible to pest attacks (Aggarwal 2005). 
Press reports and anecdotal evidence record several cases where pesticide dealers 
advised farmers to apply more pesticides than stipulated by the manufacturer.17 For 
instance, to quell the farmers’ fears of pest attacks, the pesticide dealers advised them to 
apply pesticides early, shortly after the sowing phase. The prescription in the scientific 
literature is to wait a few days before applying any pesticides. Early pesticide 
application, when not actually needed, often induces pests to acquire resistance early on 
and so much stronger pesticides are required later in the growing period (Altieri 2002). 
As pests gradually acquired resistance and farmers started on the pesticide treadmill, 
costs of cultivation rose sharply. In the absence of any regulation or quality control, 
reports of other malpractices—such as the sale of spurious seeds with very low 
germination rates—also began to surface. 
5  Debt trap and chronic poverty 
In this section we examine how the shift to cotton cultivation and the growing role of 
private traders led resource-poor farmers into a debt trap and chronic poverty. After the 
                                                 
16  The debt liability-asset value ratios for other major agricultural states in India were found to be 1.62 
for Haryana, 1.72 for Punjab, 2.71 for Gujarat, 3.55 for Kerala, 3.71 for Karnataka and 4.48 for Tamil 
Nadu. 
17  See, for instance, Ghosh (2004) and the series of articles by Sainath on the AP suicides in The Hindu. 
Available at www.hindu.com.  
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lifting of trade restrictions, the price of cotton increased by approximately 62 per cent in 
1994-95, followed by a further 33 per cent increase in 1995-96 (Figure 3). The 
resource-poor farmers saw this as the opportune moment to shift from traditional food 
crops to cotton cultivation. However, prices in the subsequent year fell 22 per cent from 
their peak level in 1995-96. Although prices in 1997-98 recovered somewhat (by around 
8 per cent), that year’s deficient rainfall produced very low yields. The reports of the 
Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) show that the net returns per 
hectare in current prices (after taking into account total costs) from cotton cultivation in 
AP were negative (a loss of Rs 1,641) in 1996-97 and only Rs 72 per hectare in 
1997-98.18 It is widely believed that the CACP underestimates many of production cost 
elements in AP, thus it is possible that the actual situation was even worse (GoAP 
2005).  
This is particularly true in the more intensive cotton growing areas of the state, such as 
the Warangal district in the Telangana region. As shown in Table 3, in 1996-97 when 
cotton prices fell from their 1994-95 peak level of Rs 2,057 per quintal to Rs 1,685, 
farmers in Warangal were unable even to recover their variable costs. Prices over the 
next year recovered somewhat to Rs 1,960 (an increase of around 16 per cent) but this 
was not enough to compensate for the sharp (around 34 per cent) fall in yields caused by 
adverse weather conditions and pest attacks. It is estimated that in the early 1960s about 
20 per cent of the cotton output was lost every year due to pest attacks (CICR 1998). By 
the late 1990s, as cotton cultivation intensified and the pest problem became more acute, 
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Source:  Author’s calculations based on CES (1998). 
                                                 
18  Cited in GoAP (2005).  
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an estimated half of the cotton output was lost due to insect pests (CICR 1998). Before 
liberalization of the cotton trade, a shortfall in production from adverse weather 
conditions in a specific region would push up prices, thus the fall in incomes would not 
be as drastic (see Figure 4). However, with the exposure to world markets, this link was 
broken and farmers were subjected to greater income volatility without any effective 
system of crop insurance.19  
The discussion in this section raises the question: if cotton cultivation was becoming 
riskier and net returns low in the late 1990s (including some years when even variable 
costs could not be recovered), what prevented the farmers from reverting to relatively 
safer food crops like maize, pulses, and millets?
 The dilemma faced by farmers in these 
circumstances are well illustrated in a recent study by Rao and Suri (2006) based on a 
primary level survey of two villages in Guntur district in AP. Rao and Suri observe that 
in the village with meagre irrigation facilities, around 98 per cent of the cropped area 
was devoted to cash crops, such as cotton and chillies. Given the very high indebtedness 
levels in the village, farmers were asked why they cultivated these cash crops instead of 
low-cost cereals, which could at least provide them with their food requirements. The 
farmers replied that ‘they would either float or sink with the cash crops because they are 
already neck-deep in debt and it is not possible to think of repaying the debts with the 
meagre returns on the low-value crops’ (Rao and Suri 2006: 1550). This explains how 
the rising debt levels from high working capital requirements but low repaying capacity 
can lead to a situation where the farmer becomes trapped into growing high-risk crops 
just to be able to make his loan repayments. Resource-poor farmers who do not have 
access to institutional sources of credit are more likely to affected by similar situations 
because they are more likely to borrow from private traders who insist on the cultivation 
of cash crops. 
Rao and Suri (2006) highlight another salient feature of the current high levels of rural 
indebtedness. In their survey, they note that a large proportion of the debt was incurred 
for agricultural expenses (about 62 per cent ) and very little was borrowed for education, 
health, social ceremonies, or consumption. Citing studies on rural indebtedness during 
the colonial period, they argue that historically a large proportion of a farmer’s debt was 
incurred for non-agricultural expenses. However, they argue that evidence from their 
own surveys and the recent NSSO data  
disproves the belief that the farmers are getting indebted because they 
take more loans to meet unproductive expenditure such as social 
ceremonies or to meet the growing needs of education and health. The 
high cost of inputs seems to be the main factor in the growing 
indebtedness of the farmers (Rao and Suri 2006: 1548).  
This is an alarming trend because it is indicative of the growing unsustainability of 
agriculture as an economic activity.20 
                                                 
19  The RFAS (2003) survey, cited earlier, reports that over 82 per cent of households surveyed did not 
have any insurance, and almost none of the poorest households had insurance (Basu and Srivastava 
2005). 
20  The Situational Assessment Survey of Farmers conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture lends further 
support to this emerging trend. The survey notes that 40 per cent of farmers, if given the choice, 
would want to ‘quit agriculture and take up some other career’.  
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Since agriculture is the major source of livelihood in the rural areas, the growing 
problems in the agricultural sector are also reflected in the trends in rural poverty rates. 
As shown in Table 5, rural poverty rates (as measured by the headcount ratio) in the 
Telangana region had declined in the pre-reform period from around 24.12 per cent in 
1983-84 to 13.92 per cent in 1993-94.21 However, in the post-reform period, poverty 
rate increased somewhat to 14.27 per cent in 1999-2000.
 Table 5 also shows real per 
capita expenditures for different farm size categories. As can be seen from this table, 
with the exception of medium farmers, real per capita expenditures for all farm size 
categories increased during the pre-reform period from 1983-84 to 1993-94 but then 
decreased during the post-reform period from 1993-94 to 1990-2000. It is important to 
note that the decline in real per capita expenditures in the post-reform period was the 
sharpest for small and marginal farmers as well as agricultural labourers, thus leading to 
an increase in rural inequality.  
From December 1997 to the end of April 1998, around 360 suicide deaths by farmers 
were reported in the cotton growing Warangal district alone in the region of Telangana. 
It is estimated that in all of AP, around 3,000 farmers have committed suicide during the 
period 1998-2003 (Vidyasagar and Chandra 2004).22 Although it is a combination of 
stress factors that compels a farmer to end his life, several recent studies conclude that 
the accumulation of huge debts and the feeling of hopelessness regarding future 
repayments triggered the suicides in most cases.23 The high incidence of suicides has 
continued unabated since the late 1990s in spite of the government’s recent efforts to 
provide subsidized credit and price support for cotton growers. 
 
Table 5 
Poverty rate and real per capita expenditure (Rs/month) in rural Telangana 
  1983-84 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 
Headcount ratio: rural Telangana  24.12 21.52 13.92 14.27 
      
Real per capita expenditure (Rs/month)  
by farm size categories 
    
Large  farmer  149.47 180.10 169.58 168.30 
Medium  farmer  135.19 135.58 130.98 128.35 
Small  farmer  113.52 127.27 133.80 127.02 
Marginal  farmer  112.36 121.43 131.92 116.13 
Agricultural labourer  96.45 100.34 110.17 102.83 
Non-agricultural self employed  117.35 135.81 132.69 125.23 
Non agricultural labourer  114.35 127.29 136.69 142.38 
Weighted average  115.60 125.72 132.14 119.57 
Source:   Vamsi (2004). 
                                                 
21  The poverty rates reported here are based on Vamsi (2004) who calculates these rates using NSSO 
data for the Telangana region. In order to make the data for 1999-2000 comparable to data from 
previous rounds when a different recall period was used in the questionnaire, she uses an adjustment 
method suggested by Angus Deaton and discusses this in detail in the appendix of her paper.  
22 The reported figures on farmer suicides, particularly from government sources, are likely to be an 
underestimate because they record suicides only among those defined as ‘farmers’. Very often, female 
cultivators and tenants are left out.  
23  This was the main finding of the Commission on Farmers Welfare (2005) set up by the government of 
Andhra Pradesh to investigate the causes behind the rise in farmer suicides.  
18 
6  Summary and conclusions 
It is generally believed that an important reason why globalization may lead to GDP 
growth but fail to reduce poverty is because the poor are unable to participate in the new 
market opportunities and are marginalized. The implicit presumption of 
unresponsiveness of the poor to new market opportunities is not always justified. In this 
paper we examined the experience of resource-poor farmers who participated 
aggressively in the new market opportunities opening up with trade reforms, but 
ironically failed to improve their wellbeing through this new opportunity. In fact, it led 
to higher inputs costs, rising indebtedness, environmental degradation, and chronic 
poverty.  
In attempting to explore why this happened, we examined how policies in the pre-
reform period—such as provision of subsidized credit and other agricultural inputs, 
output price support, and expansion of agricultural research and extension—had 
selectively favoured the better endowed regions and farmers. The majority of small and 
marginal farmers without adequate access to irrigation or institutional finance became 
marginalized by the agricultural development that focused on a narrow range of 
irrigated crops rather than the dryland crops grown by these farmers. This pattern of 
agricultural development also led to falling groundwater tables, declining soil fertility, 
and greater probability of pest attacks, all of which in turn gradually increased the long-
term costs of agricultural production in the region.  
Given this scenario, it is not surprising that when trade reform led to a sharp increase in 
the price of a crop like cotton which could be grown under rainfed conditions, resource-
poor farmers seized the opportunity. However, cotton also requires much greater 
technical expertise, working capital, and marketing network than the traditional crops 
these farmers had grown. Interestingly, as state support declined, the network of private 
traders expanded at a fast pace to fulfil not only the marketing needs of the new crops 
but also to provide much needed working capital and technical expertise. This 
expanded, and largely unregulated, operation of private traders in multiple markets also 
provided them with the opportunity to extract greater surplus from the farmers through 
their interlinked contracts. Thus, while increased participation in external markets 
exposed farmers to greater risks in terms of fluctuating prices and fraudulent dealings by 
the private traders, the shrinking role of the state reduced farmer ability to cope with 
these risks, both ex ante and ex post. The result was a decline in average incomes of the 
resource-poor farmers and rising levels of indebtedness. 
To conclude, this study lends support to the argument that generally trade reform alone 
is not sufficient to reduce poverty, but not because the poor are unresponsive to new 
market opportunities. On the contrary, globalization may offer new opportunities for the 
poor in many developing countries who have been left behind during the decades of 
capital intensive development strategies. However, it needs to be recognized that 
integration into the global economy also poses new challenges and risks. Thus there is 
need for complementary policies, such as those regarding provision of institutional 
credit, targeted safety nets, technical expertise, marketing support, and infrastructure 
that ensure that the poor are able to take full advantage of these opportunities. In 
countries such India and several other developing countries where trade reforms have 
been part of structural adjustment programmes, state support has been cut back when 
and where it is needed the most. Thus it is not surprising that the impact of these 
reforms on poverty has been minimal.  
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